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Loyal Opposition and the political constitution 
 
Grégoire Webber* 
 
 
Abstract—In studying Parliament, special attention is regularly awarded to the 
interactions between government and Commons, with the Commons identified as 
a singular body, united in its claims against or in support of the government. 
These and other commonplace understandings trade on an insufficiently political 
study of the constitution, highlighted by the relative neglect of the Official 
Opposition in public law thought. With the aim of rehabilitating the place of Her 
Majesty’s Loyal Opposition in political and constitutional theory, this essay 
explores the historical rise and present day responsibilities of the opposition and 
highlights how government and opposition are carried on by agreement and how 
the Opposition’s critical function is channelled, facilitated, and complicated by its 
pursuit of office.  
 
Keywords: Loyal Opposition, Parliament, public law, constitutional theory, 
political theory, political constitutionalism 
 
 
1.  Political Public Law 
 
The great institutions of government are regularly said to be government, Parliament, 
and judiciary and the relationships between them, but less so within them, receive 
sustained attention by public lawyers and constitutional theorists. Special attention is 
awarded to ‘the action and reaction between Ministry and the Parliament’ or, as 
contemporary writers would say, between government and Commons.1 When the 
functions of the Commons are interrogated, that institution’s constitutional 
responsibilities to maintain the government in office and to hold the government to 
account are said to yield ‘an obvious paradox’ insofar as they ‘may pull the institution 
in two diametrically opposed directions’.2 An answer to the paradox is sometimes 
offered by insisting that ‘the Cabinet dominates the House of Commons, more or less 
by constitutional definition’,3 with the consequential evaluation that the Commons 
fails in its responsibility to hold the government to account.  
 
These commonplace understandings are simplifications that trade on an insufficiently 
political study of the constitution. I use political here in the way appealed to by 
Jeremy Waldron in his call for ‘political political theory’, that is, political theory 
devoted not only to questions of justice, freedom, and equality, but also to ‘questions 
                                                 
* Canada Research Chair in Public Law and Philosophy of Law, Queen’s University, and Visiting 
Senior Fellow, London School of Economics. Email: gregoire.webber@queensu.ca. For comments on 
a previous draft, I am indebted to many colleagues, including Neil Duxbury, Graham Gee, Martin 
Loughlin, Bradley Miller, Vanessa MacDonnell, Jo Murkens, Murphy O’Connor, Kent Roach, Mark 
Walters, and the Journal’s two anonymous referees.  
1 Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution 1867 (CUP, Cambridge 2004) 100 and Adam Tomkins, 
‘“Talking in Fictions”: Jennings on Parliament’ (2004) 67 MLR 772, 782. 
2 Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003) 92.  
3 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Political Political Theory’ (2013) 21 Journal of Political Philosophy 1, 19, 
reprinted as the title chapter in Jeremy Waldron, Political Political Theory: Essays on Institutions 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass 2016) 17.  
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about political process, political institutions, and political structures’.4 This politically 
oriented study is, Waldron rightly insists, ‘massively important’ given the ‘need to 
inquire into the structures that are to house and refine our disputes and the processes 
that are to regulate the way we resolve them’.5 Our commitments to justice, freedom, 
and equality are widely shared, but the ‘circumstances of politics’ highlight how the 
need for a common framework or decision or course of action on these commitments 
confronts ‘disagreement about what that framework, decision or action should be’.6 
Among the topics and principles in need of study to bring the political back to 
political theory are democratic representation, electoral competition, political parties, 
and even those ‘fuddy-duddy topics’ of constitutional structure like federalism, 
unicameral vs. bicameral parliaments, checks and balances, and—the focus of this 
essay—the principle of loyal opposition.7 A study of the principle of loyal opposition 
is especially well-suited to interrogating how a legislative assembly can be organised 
so as to settle upon a common framework or decision on some matter of public 
concern notwithstanding disagreement on its merits; that is, how ‘to structure an 
institutional environment to house and accommodate the rival views’.8  
 
Waldron argues that political political theory would be well pursued by an 
interdisciplinary partnership with law.9 Among the branches of law, public law might 
well be thought to be an obvious partner for ‘theory addressing itself to politics and to 
the way our political institutions house and frame our disagreements about social 
ideals and orchestrate what is done about whatever aims we can settle on’.10 And yet, 
large aspects of public law thought and scholarship are themselves in need of greater 
attention to political institutions, structures, and processes. As a case in point, 
consider the relative neglect of the Loyal Opposition, a neglect not exclusive to public 
law scholarship and constitutional theory. Even political scientists and historians who 
study the rise and role of political opposition in Britain and beyond make a point of 
reminding their readers of the novelty of their subject matter of study.11 To be sure, 
legal scholarship is not altogether ignorant of the principle of loyal opposition, but 
much of the literature is dated. Since Ivor Jennings, who wrote about the Opposition 
in near all of his great works, John Griffith and Rodney Brazier are two of only a few 
                                                 
4 Waldron, ‘Political Political Theory’ (n3) 6. This passage is omitted in Waldron, Political Political 
Theory (n 3). 
5 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 5 = Waldron, ‘Political Political Theory’ (n3) 8. 
6 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP, Oxford 1999) 102. 
7 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 6 = Waldron, ‘Political Political Theory’ (n 3) 8.  
8 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 7 = Waldron, ‘Political Political Theory’ (n 3) 9. 
9 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 15 = Waldron, ‘Political Political Theory’ (n 3) 17. 
Waldron adds ‘empirical political science’.  
10 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 6 = Waldron, ‘Political Political Theory’ (n 3) 9. 
11 See, e.g., Anthony King, ‘Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West 
Germany’ (1976) 1 Legislative Studies Quarterly 11, 20; Thomas A. Hockin, ‘The Roles of the Loyal 
Opposition in Britain’s House of Commons: Three Historical Paradigms’ (1971) 25 Parliamentary 
Affairs 50, 50-51; Ludger Helms, ‘Five Ways of Institutionalizing Political Opposition: Lessons from 
the Advanced Democracies’ (2004) 39 Government and Opposition 22, 22-23; Eva Kolinsky, 
‘Introduction’ in Eva Kolinsky (ed.), Opposition in Western Europe (Croom Helm, London 1987) 1; 
Archibald S Foord, His Majesty’s Opposition 1714-1830 (OUP, Oxford 1964) 2-3; David E Smith, 
Across the Aisle: Opposition in Canadian Politics (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 2013). Robert 
A. Dahl’s edited collection Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (YUP, New Haven 1966) 
continues to earn the title of the last great comparative work on political opposition: see, e.g., Jean 
Blondel, ‘Political Opposition in the Contemporary World’ (1997) 32 Government and Opposition 462, 
462: ‘A number of comparative studies did appear after the 1966 seminal work, admittedly but . . .’. 
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public lawyers of late who have devoted scholarly attention to the Opposition.12 Even 
their work is some decades old and, like Jennings’, predates the proliferation of 
parties, including parties destined to aspire to no more than the opposition benches at 
Westminster. 
 
Now, the need for a political public law is highlighted in much of the political 
constitutionalist scholarship. Adam Tomkins’ study of ministerial responsibility 
resisted the scholarly consensus that modes of political accountability had waned and 
should be dismissed; his patient study of the political workings of the Commons 
exposed the simplifications of an insufficiently political study of the constitution.13 In 
turn, Richard Bellamy has highlighted the dangers of speaking of ‘the majority’ as a 
unified, permanent group, showing how majorities are ‘shifting coalitions of 
minorities’, and his work on political parties has helped illuminate their role in 
institutionalising contestation and inclusiveness.14 More generally, it is said that 
without a political study of the constitution, ‘public lawyers are liable to lose sight of 
the practical knowledge necessary to evaluate the workings of the constitution’.15 In 
this way, Waldron’s call for political political theory is well paired with the invitation 
made by some students of the constitution. 
 
By examining an understudied, but central part of Britain’s constitutional 
arrangements, this essay seeks to make a contribution to political public law and 
political political theory. In awarding special attention to HM Loyal Opposition at 
Westminster, my intention is not to narrow the scope of inquiry, but rather to inform 
more general appeals to the principle of loyal opposition by tracing the historical rise 
and present day constitutional responsibilities of that British institution that has done 
more than any other to inform the principle. After a brief note explaining the focus on 
the Official Opposition and its relationship to the other parliamentary opposition 
parties (sec. 2), this essay situates the present day Opposition as the contingent 
outcome of historical developments (sec. 3) before exploring the significance of the 
Opposition’s dignified titles—Her Majesty’s and Loyal (sec. 4). Next, a somewhat 
contradictory idea is examined: government and opposition are carried on by 
agreement, whereby each facilitates the tasks of the other, all the while they oppose 
each other (sec. 5). This frames the opposition’s reluctance to carry its criticism of the 
government’s programme too far and highlights the two main tools of opposition 
available under parliamentary procedure: time and argument (sec. 6). The use of 
argument is especially important and trades on the promise that Her Majesty’s 
Opposition is also Her Majesty’s Alternative Government. This provides the gateway 
to examine the idea that the Opposition’s critical and office-seeking functions provide 
both opportunities and limitations on their mutual pursuit. All of this, I aim to show, 
amounts to a significant constitutional achievement: Responsible Opposition, an idea 
analogous to the more familiar idea of Responsible Government (sec. 7). The essay 
                                                 
12 See JAG Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (George Allen & Unwin, London 
1974), JAG Griffith and Michael Ryle, Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedures (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 1989), and Rodney Brazier, ‘The Constitutional Role of the Opposition’ (1989) 40 
N.I.L.Q. 131, reprinted with modifications in Constitutional Practice (3rd edn, OUP, Oxford 1999) ch 
8.  
13 See Tomkins, Public Law (n 2) 131-169. 
14 Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 95, 230-231. 
15 Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber, ‘Rationalism in Public Law’ (2013) 76 MLR 708, 731.  
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concludes with reflections on the significance of the rise of parties in opposition with 
no prospect of forming government (sec. 8). 
 
2. Opposition and opposition 
 
Before proceeding, a note on this essay’s special, not exclusive focus: the Official 
Opposition, rather than the parliamentary opposition as a whole or political opposition 
generally. There is much opposition to government beyond Parliament and a fuller 
account of political opposition would include media, pressure groups, unions, the 
courts, and the range of other actors who also exercise the critical function of holding 
the government to account. With the fragmenting of political authority to devolved 
assemblies and local administrations, some opposition may be said now to develop to 
any government at Westminster, rather than only or especially to the government of 
the day.16 In turn, there is much opposition to government in Parliament beyond what 
the Official Opposition contributes. Intra-party dissent from government 
backbenchers, critical reports from select and public bill committees, and delaying 
tactics in the House of Lords all stand, in differing ways, in opposition to the 
government.  
 
Within Parliament, the privileging of opposition by a single-party—the biggest 
losers17—is achieved by awarding to one but not the other opposition parties official 
standing as the ‘Official Opposition’. This privilege is based on what are now dated 
assumptions about a two-party Parliament, an assumption challenged during the 
Parliaments when the Liberal Democrats secure important popular support and 
challenged again with the rise of the Scottish Nationalist Party, claiming near all of 
Scotland’s seats in the 2015 general election. Nonetheless, the pendulum swing 
between Conservatives and Liberals between 1859 and 1918 and between 
Conservatives and Labour since 1923, with the exception of the wartime and the 2010 
peacetime coalitions, go some way to justifying special status to the biggest losers. 
Doing so, as we will see, empowers the capital ‘O’ Opposition in its relations with the 
government and, for some, ‘this single function, without qualification, without 
obscurity, without the trading of votes between minor parties’ is one of its great 
virtues.18 I aim to show how the Official Opposition differs from the other political 
formations in opposition not only by virtue of numbers, but also by virtue of 
constitutional position and responsibilities, including readiness for and expectation of 
office. To mark the distinction, I capitalise ‘Opposition’ when referring to HM Loyal 
Opposition and employ lower-case ‘opposition’ when referring to the opposition 
benches generally. 
 
Calls for a different electoral system, which could expand the representation of 
smaller parties in the Commons, have their merit, but to appreciate the full impact of a 
                                                 
16 See David Denver, ‘Great Britain: From “Opposition with a Capital ‘O’” to Fragmented Opposition’ 
in Eva Kolinsky (ed), Opposition in Western Europe (Croom Helm, London 1987) 78-115. The idea of 
understanding federalism through the lens of loyal opposition is explored (more or less successfully) in 
Heather K Gerken, ‘The Loyal Opposition’ (2014) 123 Yale LJ 101. 
17 The label is Waldron’s, who frames his study of loyal opposition around the distinction between 
winners and losers: Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) c. 5 (‘The Principle of Loyal 
Opposition’). 
18 Henry Fairlie, The Life of Politics (Methuen & Co, London 1968) 195. See further Denver (n 16) 82 
and Giovanni Sartori, ‘Opposition and Control Problems and Prospects’ (1966) 1 Government and 
Opposition 149, 153. 
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differently constituted Commons is to appreciate how this would change the 
constitutional roles of the Official Opposition. To gain that appreciation, one must 
first come to understand the place of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, an 
understanding facilitated by assuming a majority government. In sec. 8, I examine the 
role of the opposition absent that assumption. 
 
3.  From Treason to Standing Opposition  
 
How did the British constitution ‘stumble onto’ the practice of Loyal Opposition?19 
Without a sense of history, one cannot fully appreciate the significance of Jennings’ 
confident claim that the constitution ‘not only does not expect conformity, it demands 
the opposite’.20 When situated in historical perspective, that demand signals 
something of an achievement. 
 
The idea of Parliament as a High Court recalls the medieval practice of bringing 
petitions to the attention of the King. Parliaments would assemble for supply and for 
the redress of grievances on matters local and private, matters over which the 
Monarch would not otherwise attend.21 On the Great Matters of State over which the 
Monarch did exercise prerogative powers—among them, the ‘royal succession, the 
church, and foreign policy’—no grievance could be entertained and no member of 
Parliament could ‘presume with safety’ to criticise.22 The only safe criticism was on 
matters local and private; to be loyal was to support the Crown in those matters under 
the jurisdiction of the prerogative and to bring to the attention of the Crown other 
matters for redress. Constitutional arrangements did not allow for opposition as the 
practice is understood today: against that standard, one could be loyal or in 
opposition, but not both. The boundaries of criticism were demarcated by a 
jurisdictional divide: the ‘Crown represented the national interest and Parliament the 
special and local interest’ and to venture opinion and commentary beyond the local to 
the national was to approach treason.23 Eliot’s Case (1629) captures the risk 
confronting those who would engage in ‘disloyal’ speech in the Commons: the 
dissidents were charged with conspiracy to resist the King.24 They who dared to 
criticise the Crown on matters public and general ‘effectively could be called leaders 
of “the Opposition”’, but no one, not least the Monarch, would have thought them a 
loyal opposition.25 
 
                                                 
19 Dahl would write that the ‘system of managing the major political conflicts of a society by allowing 
one or more opposition parties to compete with the governing parties . . . is one of the greatest and 
most unexpected social discoveries that man has ever stumbled onto’: ‘Preface’ in Robert A. Dahl (ed), 
Political Oppositions in Western Democracies (YUP, New Haven 1966) xvii-xviii. 
20 Ivor Jennings, The British Constitution (5th edn, CUP, Cambridge 1971) 87. 
21 The pairing of these functions was carried forward symbolically until ‘supply days’ were relabelled 
‘opposition days’ in the Standing Orders of the House. 
22 Hockin (n 11) 52.  
23 ibid. 56. Hockin adds at 55: ‘There was no recognition in theory or in fact that local grievances or 
petitions were intrinsically “in opposition” or in tension with the Crown.’ 
24 (1629) 3 St.Tr. 294. Eliot was one of the authors of the Petition of Right 1628, which challenged the 
King on many Great Matters of State. 
25 Hockin (n 11) 54. It bears emphasising that because supply could be denied, space for disagreement 
between King and Parliament, including on the Great Matters of State, was possible, even if it was a 
treacherous undertaking.  
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Following the English civil war, a convention Parliament, summoned without 
sovereign decree, invited William and Mary to take the throne on the conditions laid 
out in the Bill of Rights 1689. The many denials of ‘regal authority’ and references to 
the ‘pretence of prerogative’ in that constitutional instrument affirmed that the Great 
Matters of State were no longer solely of the Crown’s concern. The Monarch was 
denied sole responsibility for representing the community and public good: that task 
was now to be shared, in uncertain ways, between the three estates of the realm. The 
constitution was to be ‘balanced’ by the interactions of Crown, Lords, and Commons, 
no one of which could claim to represent the public good to the exclusion of the 
others.26  
 
By expanding the jurisdiction of parliamentary debate into the traditional realm of 
prerogative, the problem arose of relating the Crown’s administration to 
parliamentary opinion. In time, constitutional arrangements evolved to provide that 
the King’s council would have to command the confidence of the Commons.27 During 
the eighteenth century, ‘the king was effectively required to appoint as ministers only 
those who could manage Parliament’.28 It would be premature to conclude that this 
resolved the question of loyalty in opposition. The King’s councillors remained, for 
some time yet, very much of the King’s choosing and whilst a distinction between 
King and councillor could negotiate around the injunction that the King can do no 
wrong, two challenges persisted: first, so long as the King continued to rule through 
his councillors, ‘opposing the measures supported by Ministers was regarded as 
unconstitutional because they were, very largely, the King’s measures’;29 and second, 
even the idea of opposing ministers rather than the measures they carried ‘involved a 
repudiation of the King’s prerogative to choose his own servants’.30  
 
The slow decline in these understandings in the course of the reign of George I can be 
attributed, in part, to the King’s absence from the meetings of cabinet. Although it is 
said that his absence was the consequence of his lack of command of English, it also 
maintained the constitutional principle that the King can do no wrong: by acting on 
the advice of his councillors as recorded in cabinet, the King could avoid accusations 
of wrongdoing, imputing wrongdoing to his ministers.31 With the rise of cabinet 
government and the growing distance between the King and the management of 
cabinet affairs, opposition could be contemplated without imputing disloyalty to the 
King. It is in this light that the full significance of Bagehot’s insight can be 
appreciated: ‘critical opposition is the consequence of cabinet government’.32 Others 
have captured the idea by recalling how opposition is a ‘dependent concept’, such that 
‘the character of the opposition is tied to the character of the government’.33 With the 
rise of cabinet government separable from the King, opposition to government could 
                                                 
26 ibid 57. 
27 Allen Potter, ‘Great Britain: Opposition with a Capital “O”’ in Robert A. Dahl (ed), Political 
Oppositions in Western Democracies (YUP, New Haven 1966) 6; Martin Loughlin, Foundations of 
Public Law (OUP, Oxford 2010) 246-247, 263-264. 
28 Loughlin (n 27) 264. 
29 Ivor Jennings, Party Politics, vol. II: The Growth of Parties (CUP, Cambridge1960) 3. 
30 ibid 3. 
31 Loughlin (n 27) 264. 
32 Bagehot (n 1) 14. 
33 Blondel (n 11) 463. See also Ghita Ionescu and Isabel de Madariaga, Opposition: Past and Present 
of a Political Institution (Pelican 1972) 10: parliamentary opposition is ‘the altera pars of 
government’. 
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be separated from opposition to the Crown. The historical tension between the King’s 
government and Parliament was to be replaced with a new tension, a tension within 
Parliament. 
 
In the years between the premierships of Sir Robert Walpole in 1721 and Pitt the 
Younger in 1784, parliamentary opposition gained recognition as ‘a feature of normal 
political life’.34 However, the propriety of critical opposition was nonetheless 
bounded by the political fact that the King remained responsible for selecting his 
government. Parliamentarians could oppose measures and sometimes ministers, but 
opposition to His Majesty’s Government was not in keeping with the practice of the 
House.35 To propose systematic, standing opposition to the government was contrary 
to constitutional practice in two ways: first, it was tainted with disloyalty in 
questioning the King’s judgment in selecting his council;36 and second, it was 
unparliamentary to prejudge the government’s measures, to be a ‘party man’ opposed 
to government whatever the measures and whoever the men. The good parliamentary 
man, the ‘man with no faction sworn’,37 would exercise judgment on measures and 
men, but would not surrender that judgment by opposing the government 
indiscriminately.  
 
By 1784, the King’s control over the selection of his ministers was giving way to the 
Commons.38 The King’s discretion would dwindle to the point that Bagehot could 
write, less than a century later, that the first function of the House of Commons is to 
elect the Prime Minister.39 The removal of the King from the task of selecting the 
ministry made it possible to contemplate an expression unthinkable earlier in the 
history of the constitution. During parliamentary debate in 1826, Sir John Cam 
Hobhouse spoke to the government’s proposal to separate the offices of President of 
the Board of Trade and Treasurer of the Navy: 
 
The right hon. Secretary for Foreign Affairs . . . could not conceive why 
they should now go back to the old system, and employ two persons to 
do those duties which were efficiently performed by one. It was said to 
be very hard on his majesty’s ministers to raise objections to this 
proposition. For his own part, he thought it was more hard on his 
majesty’s opposition to compel them to take this course.40 
 
Prompting laughter in the House, the phrase was immediately taken up in debate, first 
by the Foreign Secretary and then by George Tierney who said that Hobhouse ‘could 
not have invented a better phrase to designate us than that which he has adopted, for 
we are certainly to all intents and purposes, a branch of his majesty’s government’.41 
                                                 
34 Nevil Johnson, ‘Opposition in the British Political System’ (1997) 32 Government and Opposition 
487, 488. 
35 Hockin (n 11) 61. See also Potter (n 27) 6. 
36 Hockin (n 11) 61. 
37 ibid 61. 
38 Johnson (n 34) 488. 
39 Bagehot (n 1) 94. 
40 Hansard vol. XV, p. 135 (10 April 1826) (emphasis added). 
41 As reported in HJ Hanham, The Nineteenth Century Constitution 1815-1914: Documents and 
Commentary (CUP, Cambridge 1969) 114 and Edward Porritt, The Unreformed House of Commons, 
vol. 1 (CUP, Cambridge 1903) 510. Tierney explained the meaning of his phrase by adding: ‘Its 
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We need not follow Tierney in claiming that the Opposition is a branch of His 
Majesty’s Government to appreciate the significance of the informal title awarded to 
members critical of the government’s men and measures. Now that the royal 
prerogative to select the government had weakened, it became possible to claim that 
neither those in nor those out of government were ‘more or less the Queen’s Friends 
than the other’.42  
 
The rise of party would occur more or less contemporaneously and would help settle 
the new practice of standing, systemic opposition, with two parties in more or less 
indiscriminate disagreement with each other, vying for the responsibilities of office. 
By 1855, an essayist on ‘Parliamentary Opposition’ could write that ‘the peculiar 
mark of the professed oppositionist is . . . that his objections are indiscriminate, his 
opposition general and systematic’.43 For the party in opposition, there is a ‘universal 
and conclusive presumption against all propositions coming from a certain quarter’ 
with the only question confronting the Opposition being not whether but how to 
oppose, ‘by what arguments, in what manner, and what time, and to what extent’.44  
 
Taken together, the rise of party and of standing opposition to measures, men, and 
ministries made it possible to understand Her Majesty’s Opposition as Her Majesty’s 
Alternative Government. In the general election of 1841, Sir Robert Peel’s Tory 
Opposition returned more members than the Liberal Government and, on Queen 
Victoria’s invitation, Peel became Prime Minister in what is generally considered to 
be the first example of a party in opposition elected to assume the office of 
government.45 The elections of 1868, 1874, and 1880 further established the practice 
and expectation that government and Opposition would succeed each other in office.46 
The swing of the pendulum between political formations within the Commons 
allowed for the idea of a standing, systemic opposition to government, formed of a 
body of members ready and able to assume office. The virtue of balancing the 
constitution around the three estates of Monarch, Lords, and Commons had been 
substituted by the virtue of balancing the constitution around two political formations.  
 
The transition from the verb ‘to oppose’ to the noun ‘the Opposition’ tracks the 
transition from opposition as treason on all but private and local matters to opposition 
on measures and ministers but not ministries and, finally, to opposition to 
government—from tactical to targeted to standing opposition. When Parliament, in 
1932, came to define the Opposition for the purposes of awarding its Leader a salary, 
it preferred the simple statement that the Leader of the Opposition is the leader of ‘the 
party in opposition to Her Majesty’s Government having the greatest numerical 
strength in the House of Commons’.47 Even so simple a statement is significant for 
the emphasis placed on party and on standing, indiscriminate opposition. Also 
                                                                                                                                           
proceedings from some time past have proved that, though the gentlemen opposite are in office, we are 
in power.’ 
42 Potter (n 27) 7. 
43 Anonymous, ‘Parliamentary Opposition’ (1855) 101 The Edinburgh Review 1, 8. Some have 
attributed this unsigned essay to Sir George Cornewall Lewis: see, e.g., Rodney Barker, ‘Introduction’ 
in Rodney Barker (ed), Studies in Opposition (MacMillan Press, London 1971) 11-12. 
44 Anonymous (n 43) 8. 
45 Johnson (n 34) 489. 
46 HJ Hanham, ‘Opposition techniques in British politics (1867-1914)’ (1966) 2 Government and 
Opposition 35, 36; Ivor Jennings, Cabinet Government (3rd edn, CUP, Cambridge 1959) 37. 
47 Ministers of the Crown Act 1937, s. 2.  
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significant is the emphasis placed on the House of Commons as the site for the 
confrontation between government and Opposition. The Commons was the engine for 
democratic, party politics and the site for the confrontation between governments and 
governments-in-waiting. The balance of the constitution was very much now 
primarily located within the Commons. 
 
4.  Dignified Opposition 
 
The Opposition’s dignified titles—Her Majesty’s and Loyal—signal the standing of 
the Opposition within the constitution. Although the etymology of the first of these 
two titles (‘Her Majesty’s’) can be traced to Hobhouse, the history of the second 
designation (‘Loyal’) is rather more difficult to track. It is sometimes claimed that 
Hobhouse used the full expression ‘His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’ in parliamentary 
debate, but Hansard does not support the claim. What is more, official parliamentary 
publications do not employ the second dignified title, preferring instead ‘Her 
Majesty’s Official Opposition’.48 And yet, despite its uncertain history and the 
absence of official endorsement in Westminster publications, it is the idea of loyal 
opposition that sustains so much scholarly attention, within the United Kingdom and 
beyond. 
 
Some have claimed the pairing of ‘loyal’ with ‘opposition’ to be ‘an eternal 
paradox’49 or at least to have ‘the appearance of a paradox’;50 others have sought to 
answer the paradox by searching for an object of loyalty that would allow opposition 
to the government whilst maintaining loyalty to something more fundamental. To this 
end, it has been suggested that the Opposition is loyal to ‘the Crown’,51 ‘the 
institutions of the state’,52 ‘the established constitutional framework’,53 ‘the basic 
features of the Constitution’ or ‘constitutional essentials’,54 ‘parliamentary 
democracy’,55 or, simply, ‘the rules of the game’.56 There may be truth captured by 
each proposal, but it is only a partial truth, deflected by searching for a singular object 
of loyalty owed by the Opposition. There are, I aim to demonstrate, other and truer 
ways to approach the question. 
 
Consider how no government, no matter the popularity of its actions, escapes dissent 
and the attention of those who think they could do better. Quot homines, tot sententiae 
                                                 
48 See, eg, the UK Parliament’s webpage ‘Government & Opposition’, online: 
www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/government-and-opposition1 (last accessed 2 March 2016). 
49 Otto Kirchheimer, ‘The Waning of Opposition in Parliamentary Regimes’ (1957) 24 Social Research 
127, 127. 
50 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 123. 
51 RM Punnett, Front-Bench Opposition: The Role of the Leader of the Opposition, the Shadow 
Cabinet and Shadow Government in British Politics (Heinemann, London 1973) 399; Jennings, 
Cabinet Government  (n 46) 363-364. 
52 A Lawrence Lowell, The Government of England, volume I (new edn, MacMillan Company, New 
York 1920) 451. 
53 Punnett (n 51) 13 (emphasis removed); Richard Rose, Do Parties Make a Difference? (2nd edn, 
Macmillan Press, London 1984) 23. 
54 ibid. 13 (emphasis removed). In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Belknap Press 2001) 49, John 
Rawls suggests that ‘government and its loyal opposition agree on . . . constitutional essentials’, one of 
which is the principle of loyal opposition. For discussion, see Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 
118-119. 
55 Brazier, Constitutional Practice (n 12) 167. 
56 KC Wheare, Legislatures (2nd edn, OUP Oxford 1967) 80; Smith (n 11) 6. 
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(There are as many opinions as there are men). For Waldron, disagreement 
attributable to the complexities of the public good is the ‘premise of everything’ for 
thinking about the principle of loyal opposition.57 The question for those who protest 
government decisions is how to manifest their disapproval. Are they to be 
revolutionary, engaged in rebellion and the overthrow of constitution and 
government, or are they to be committed to make known their discord and discontent 
but only to replace the government at the next constitutional opportunity? The answer 
is informed not only by the dispositions of those who dissent, but also by the 
dispositions of those against whom that dissent is manifested. 
 
Recalling the seventeenth century view that opposition to the Crown on the Great 
Matters of State was treasonous (sec. 3) helps us see this. The full significance of the 
Opposition’s dignified title ‘Loyal’ is grasped by recalling its history, which 
highlights the slow change in the government’s disposition to the Opposition: from 
opposition as treason against the King (disloyal opposition) to standing opposition 
carried on in the Queen’s name (HM Loyal Opposition). On this view, I argue, loyalty 
is to be measured not principally as something owed by the Opposition to some object 
(Crown, state, constitution, etc.), but rather is to be measured by what is owed to the 
Opposition. The Opposition is not to be labelled treasonous or subservice by the 
government it criticises and opposes. It’s constitutional standing is not to be 
questioned on that basis. Waldron arrives at this same conclusion without appealing to 
history: ‘Instead of saying that the word “loyal” in “Loyal Opposition” refers to a 
stipulated focus of allegiance, we should say that it indicates to the way in which the 
opposition party must be regarded in a constitutional system.’58 The convention that 
the Opposition is recognised as both Her Majesty’s and Loyal (or Official) is, thus, a 
double reminder to the government and its supporters that they are to view the 
opposition as political adversaries, not enemies.59 ‘War is the continuation of politics 
by other means’, said Clausewitz, but politics, on this understanding of loyal 
Opposition, is not war by other means. Government and opposition are bounded 
together as a ‘fraternity of adversaries’;60 theirs is, in Burke’s imagery, a ‘regulated 
rivalry’.61 It is an obvious, but nonetheless important point to recall how peaceful 
changes of government ‘could not take place if vengeance followed dismissal’.62  
 
It may be thought that the ‘loyal’ designation may be withheld, with good reason, for 
‘anti-system’ parties who do question the constitution, its essentials or fundamental 
features, or the place of the Crown in the constitution. Would this not, then, suggest 
that loyalty is indeed owed not only to, but also by, the Opposition? Without resisting 
the invitation, we should be hesitant before too readily welcoming it. Canada’s 35th 
Parliament (1993-1997) welcomed the leader of the separatist Bloc Québécois, Lucien 
Bouchard, as Leader of the Official Opposition. During his tenure, Quebec held its 
                                                 
57 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 94. 
58 ibid 122 (emphasis in original). See more generally Helms (n 11). 
59 See Sartori (n 18) 151. The same point is made by Rose (n 53) 78 on the basis of a study of British 
MPs: ‘Even though British MPs tend to disagree about specific political issues, they do not see 
themselves engaged in confrontation between forces of good and evil.’ 
60 Michael Ignatieff, ‘On Partisanship: Enemies and Adversaries in Politics’, Public Lecture at Stanford 
University (15 October 2012), reproduced with modifications in Michael Ignatieff, Fire and Ashes 
(Random House, Toronto 2013) ch. 13. 
61 See Nancy Rosenblum, On the Side of Angels: An Appreciation of Parties and Partisanship 
(Princeton UP, Princeton 2008) 119-126. 
62 Foord (n 11) 8. 
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second referendum on Quebec independence in 1995, with the Prime Minister of 
Canada and the Opposition Leader confronting each other not only within the 
Commons, but also in the course of the referendum. Notwithstanding its political 
purpose, Bloc Québécois MPs fulfilled their parliamentary duties as the Opposition, 
which may give one pause before withdrawing the qualifier ‘loyal’ to even this 
example of Official Opposition. 
 
Understanding ‘loyalty’ as, in part, owed to the Opposition by the government, it is 
significant that the 1937 Act providing for a salary to the Leader of the Opposition 
was proposed by the government and that the salary is charged not to the party in 
opposition, but to the Consolidated Fund.63 Some years later, it would be the 
government again that would commit itself in the Queen’s Speech of 1974 to 
‘consider the provision of financial assistance to enable Opposition parties more 
effectively to fulfil their Parliamentary functions’,64 a commitment it fulfilled when, 
on a motion proposed by a government minister, the Commons resolved to fund ‘any 
Opposition party in this House to assist that party in carrying out its Parliamentary 
business’.65 In these two ways, the government sought financial support to facilitate 
the work of its adversaries.66  
 
There are other ways in which the government signals the constitutional standing of 
the Opposition. For example, the Leader of the Opposition and some members of his 
shadow cabinet will, at the request of the government, be sworn in as Privy 
Councillors and, from time to time, will be entrusted by the Prime Minister and 
cabinet colleagues with state secrets and other confidential information ‘on Privy 
Councillor terms’.67 The Prime Minister will stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the 
Leader of the Opposition in representing the Commons at the Bar of the House of 
Lords at the State Opening of Parliament. The government will see to it that the 
schedule of visiting foreign dignitaries allows for a meeting with the Opposition 
Leader. And Prime Ministers since Douglas-Home have authorised the civil service to 
meet with and advise the Opposition on its electoral programme so as to facilitate its 
transition to office in the event that it should secure victory at the polls.68  
 
The dispositions of Opposition and government members to regard each other as 
constitutional actors—not enemies in a civil war—are facilitated and encouraged by 
the swing of the pendulum. The alternation of office between two main political 
                                                 
63 Ministers of the Crown Act 1937, s. 2; see now Ministerial and Other Salaries Act 1975, s. 2. The 
Parliament of Canada was the first Commonwealth parliament to introduce a salary for its Leader of 
the Loyal Opposition, in 1905: for discussion and references, see Dean E McHenry, ‘Formal 
Recognition of the Leader of the Opposition in Parliaments of the British Commonwealth’ (1954) 69 
Political Science Quarterly 438. 
64 HC Deb vol. 870 col. 47 (12 March 1974).  
65 HC Deb vol. 888 col. 869-870 (25 March 1975). The House of Lords adopted a similar scheme in 
1996.  
66 There is a third way, though the benefits are not exclusive to the Opposition. In 2000, Parliament 
adopted legislation to provide funding to parties to assist ‘with the development of policies for 
inclusion in any manifesto’: Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, s. 12. 
67 For examples, see Punnett (n 51) 203. 
68 See Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual (1st edn, October 2011) 16. A number of Acts of 
Parliament highlight the need for cooperation between government and Opposition on certain 
appointments: see House of Commons (Administration) Act 1978, s. 1(2)(c); Intelligence Services Act 
1994, s. 10(3); Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, s. 2(4); and Justice and Security Act 
2013, s. 1(5). 
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parties promotes the understanding that the Opposition is the government-in-waiting 
and, correspondingly, that the government is the Opposition-in-waiting. This feature 
of parliamentary government helps situate what Waldron identifies as the 
‘challenging idea’ that the constitution actively ‘empowers’, ‘sponsors’, and 
‘facilitates’ those that are defined, for the time being, as ‘losers’.69 Waldron’s ‘losers’ 
are, it is true, losers in the context of the grand electoral clash of parties vying for 
office, but that need not obscure from view how they are winners in local contests and 
in receiving important, even if insufficient, popular support. They have secured their 
seats in the House of Commons even if in insufficient numbers to form government. 
Some regional parties (e.g. the Scottish National Party) signal to the ‘winners’ the 
very qualified nature of their win so far as the region is concerned. 
 
5.  Opposition by Agreement 
 
The art of opposition is far more subtle than ‘to oppose everything and propose 
nothing’, a thesis attributed to Sir George Tierney and repeated by others since.70 The 
thesis captures how the primary function of the Official Opposition and the opposition 
generally is critical: given the government’s agenda-setting role in parliamentary 
affairs, it is to react to government legislation and administration.71 The Opposition 
accepts its present station as the unchosen alternative to the government. But what is 
it ‘to oppose’? And to what end is opposition pursued? In failing to acknowledge the 
complexity of these questions, the Tierney thesis fails to situate the Opposition’s 
critical function within the long-standing responsibility of the House to hold the 
government to account. 
 
Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition now carries the greater part of the House of 
Commons’ constitutional responsibility to realise ministerial responsibility. What was 
once the role of the House as a whole to a government external to its membership has 
evolved to become the critical function of the opposition within the House. That is not 
to suggest that ministerial responsibility is owed to the members opposite; it is owed 
to the Commons, but primarily demanded and scrutinised by the opposition. The 
opposition members are rightly said to be ‘the most vigilant public parliamentary 
check on the misuse of power by the Government’,72 to be ‘critics by profession’,73 
and to be ‘ex-officio judges of the existing administration’.74 They assume primary 
responsibility for the duty of the House as a whole. 
 
As early as 1855, it could be said that ‘it is by the leaders of the Opposition that the 
detailed criticism of the measures of the Government is carried on’.75 It is for this 
reason surprising that so careful and informed a student of the constitution as Adam 
                                                 
69 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 104. 
70 See Anonymous (n 43) 8; Hanham (n 46) 35; King (n 11) 18. See further Ivor Jennings, Parliament 
(2nd edn, CUP, Cambridge 1969) 167 and Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (n 12) 
338. 
71 For a defense of how the government’s agenda-setting role assists, rather than frustrates, 
Parliament’s legislative function, see Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (OUP, Oxford 
2012) ch 6. 
72 Hockin (n 11) 63. 
73 Jennings, The British Constitution (n 20) 86.  
74 Anonymous (n 43) 3.  
75 ibid 3. See also Wheare (n 56) 79; LS Amery, Thoughts on the Constitution (OUP, Oxford 1964) 31: 
‘it is the Opposition upon which has devolved most of the original critical function of Parliament.’ 
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Tomkins continues to insist that the ‘Government and Opposition thesis . . . cannot 
explain this most basic of Parliament’s functions: namely, to hold the Government to 
constitutional account’.76 Tomkins’ concern is that the government and Opposition 
dynamic, with its emphasis on ‘the cloak of party’, risks ‘deceiv[ing] us into thinking 
that the House of Commons has now forgotten’ how to hold the government to 
account, and so risks concealing from view the role of the good parliamentarian.77 
The ‘more venerable and deeper dynamic’, for Tomkins, is that between Crown and 
Parliament.78 
 
Tomkins is right to insist that, if carried too far, the government and Opposition thesis 
obscures from view the role played by the good parliamentarian, who will jealously 
guard the House from transgressions by ministers of whatever political colour. But in 
counselling against taking the government and Opposition thesis too far in one 
direction, Tomkins fails to acknowledge how the Opposition is the body through 
which the Commons now fulfils the greater part of the responsibility to hold the 
government to account. That is not to say that the Opposition carries the whole of the 
burden: the other opposition members, the committees of the House, and the 
government’s backbenchers—never mere yes-men and yes-women—share the 
constitutional responsibility and have taken measures to increase their ability to carry 
it out.79 The management of a government majority is no easy feat and government 
ministers need their backbenchers: they ‘need their moral support’ and ‘need them not 
to cause rows and to make hostile speeches that will attract publicity’; above all, they 
need their votes.80 But the government backbenchers’ duty is also to support the 
government, a duty that qualifies the way in which they hold the government to 
account. The other opposition parties are awarded some status in debate and on 
committees to hold the government to account. But despite all this, it is fair to say 
that, with respect to the Commons’ critical functions, the Opposition is the loudest, 
even if not the only, critical voice in the chamber. Tomkins’ Crown and Parliament 
dynamic may have been venerable, but it is no longer, nor has it been for some time, 
the dynamic of the constitution.81  
 
The Commons’ checking function is exercised in parliamentary debate. As a 
‘speaking place’, Parliament and its debating chambers will hear more than one side; 
in this respect, the constitutional role of the Opposition in Parliament can be said to 
formalise the principle of audi alteram partem. In parliamentary debate, the Speaker 
will recognise, in turn, a member from the government benches and a member from 
the opposition benches. Because the country is not unanimous on the requirements of 
public good, so the House will not be unanimous in voice or vote. It will hear much 
that need be said (and it will hear much else besides). When the question is put, the 
House will record its division. Opposition members will go into the division lobbies 
‘not because they expect to be successful but because they consider that a formal 
                                                 
76 Tomkins, ‘Talking in Fictions’ (n 1) 783 (footnote omitted). 
77 ibid 782. 
78 ibid 782. 
79 For a review of the Backbench Business Committee, see House of Commons Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee Report, Revisiting Rebuilding the House: the impact of the Wright 
Reforms, Third Report of Session 2013–14 (HC 82, 18 July 2013). 
80 King (n 11) 15. 
81 See, eg, ibid 26: ‘it is hardly too strong to say, with regard to Britain, that there is no such thing as 
“the relationship between the executive and the legislature.” The language simply does not fit the 
facts.’ See also ibid 11. 
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protest is necessary’.82 The House of Commons’ expressive, teaching, and informing 
functions are realised neither by government nor by Opposition, but by debate in the 
House. Together, though without implying partnership, the two sides of the House set 
out to ‘express the mind’ of the people on all matters, to ‘teach the nation what it does 
not know’, and to inform the nation of ‘what is wrong’.83  
 
In carrying out the Commons’ scrutiny of government legislation and administration, 
the Opposition participates in the law-making process initiated by the government and 
criticises government administration. It accepts JS Mill’s insistence that there is a 
‘radical distinction between controlling the business of government, and actually 
doing it’ and that ‘the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and 
control the government: to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full 
exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; to 
censure them if found condemnable’.84 The minority accepts the right of the majority 
to govern on the understanding that the majority recognises the right of the minority 
to criticise. This reciprocity grounds the idea that both Opposition and government are 
carried on by agreement. Now, this may not hold for those opposition parties that 
have no hope for office. The SNP, for example, may resist a government programme 
in a way that the Loyal Opposition would not.  But even here, the smaller opposition 
parties will accept some measure of reciprocity. This idea can be approached by 
contemplating the struggles both sides of the House would face if either failed to 
facilitate the other.  
 
Consider how the government, with its majority, could suspend all opposition time 
under the Standing Orders and seek a programme motion (previously: a guillotine) to 
complete the parliamentary stages of its bills by a certain date and within a fixed 
number of sittings. The government, with its majority, could amend the Standing 
Orders to fulfil the oft-quoted simplification that the government controls the House 
and can thereby deny a voice to the opposition in debate. In turn, consider how the 
opposition can frustrate the progression of government business in a large number of 
small ways,85 including by disrupting speeches by government members, denying 
quorum in committee meetings, raising repeated points of order, and delaying the 
passage of even non-contentious bills by proposing amendments in committee and on 
the floor of the House that must be voted down. When government and opposition are 
carried on by disagreement, neither will be facilitated in fulfilling its responsibilities: 
government will not get its bills or anywhere near all of them and the opposition will 
not make known its criticism or present itself to the public as a responsible 
alternative. In turn, when both understand that the country and the Commons have 
preferred the party in government to the parties in opposition, and that the 
government must govern through the Commons and be responsible to it, both 
government and opposition are facilitated: the government will see the greater part of 
its programme through and the opposition will make known its criticism.  
                                                 
82 W Ivor Jennings, ‘The Technique of Opposition’ (1935) 6 Political Quarterly 208, 211. 
83 Bagehot (n 1) 95-96. Ionescu and de Madariaga (n 33) 70 put the point this way: the Opposition is 
‘the representative of opinions, interests and values not included in government’. This is not to say that 
they succeed: some find their representative in the other opposition parties; others find themselves 
unrepresented and without voice in the chamber. 
84 JS Mill, Considerations on Representative Government 1861 (CUP, Cambridge 2010) 89, 104. 
Mill’s quote assumes a government distinct from an assembly, but the idea holds even when the 
government is selected from amongst the members of the assembly. 
85 Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (n 12) 21. 
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In this respect, both sides of the House share in governing the Commons and the 
country more generally, even if some on the opposition benches would seek to disrupt 
the government’s programme come what may. Yet, on the whole, the opposition’s 
active participation in parliamentary proceedings aims to make legislation better by 
improving government proposals and, thus, by improving the legislature’s actions. By 
critically engaging with bills and serving on committees, the opposition participates in 
the work of Parliament, which the government leads but does not subsume or replace. 
Throughout, both government and opposition are ‘conversant with the school-boy 
maxim, “two can play at that fun”’,86 and so are secure in the knowledge that a 
programme motion to secure time here may result in opposition obstruction to waste 
time there and vice versa. That is not to say that the government will not contract 
opposition time or exceptionally impose a programme motion or that the opposition 
will not on occasion obstruct the government’s legislative programme to make known 
its deep discontent, but both strategies proceed against a shared understanding that the 
opposition is to be provided with opportunities for criticism and the government will 
fulfil the greater part of its programme.  
 
This cooperation could be taken to be an illustration of governing by the opposition, 
but it should not be taken quite as far as David Fontana wishes to take it in his 
account of ‘Government in Opposition’. That account conflates the role of the 
opposition ‘to dissent [and] to note the problems with what the government is doing’, 
on the one hand, with the inclusion of opposition members in cabinet or in key 
legislative or judicial roles, on the other.87 In so doing, Fontona’s analysis misfires by 
including the Official Opposition’s chairmanship of the Select Committee for Public 
Accounts88 and the standing practice of its Leader to examine the Prime Minister 
during Questions to the Prime Minister as examples of ‘winners’ powers’ being given 
to ‘losers’. In truth, these are examples of ways in which the opposition holds the 
government to account, checking and criticising the exercise of ‘winners’ powers’ by 
ministers. Too generous an account of what to include as ‘Government in Opposition’ 
risks undermining the promise of Aristotle’s good citizen, who is able and willing to 
rule and be ruled in turn.89 The opposition’s constitutional responsibilities are best 
captured precisely as being otherwise than the responsibilities of government. 
 
The idea that both opposition and government are carried on by agreement is 
informed by more than reciprocal self-restraint. The government and Opposition’s 
joint management of House affairs is also realised by active cooperation behind the 
Speaker’s Chair. It is significant that the discussions between government and 
Opposition off the floor of the chamber and beyond the pages of Hansard have 
acquired the label ‘the usual channels’.90 When in the chamber, the opposition and 
government record their disagreement in debate and division; when beyond the glare 
of publicity, they seek agreement on parliamentary management. The two sides of the 
House can afford to disagree in public because they have already agreed so much in 
                                                 
86 Bagehot (n 1) 213.  
87 David Fontana, ‘Government in Opposition’ (2009) 119 Yale LJ 548, 556-557. 
88 The Standing Orders provide that the chairmanship of the Public Accounts Committee shall be held 
by an opposition member: S.O. 122B(8)(f).  
89 Aristotle, Politics, bk. III, ch. 13, 1283b42–1284a4. 
90 For an informative empirical study, see Michael Rush and Clare Ettinghausen, Opening Up the 
Usual Channels (Hansard Society, London 2002). 
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private. Even the exaggerated disagreement between the Prime Minister and the 
Leader of the Opposition during Questions to the Prime Minister rests on the prior 
agreement to meet for the occasion. The Leader of the Opposition will select topics 
for debate on 17 of the 20 opposition days set aside in the Standing Orders and the 
government will award priority in the parliamentary calendar to a motion of no 
confidence tabled by him.91 
 
Through the usual channels, government and Opposition facilitate the fulfilment of 
each other’s constitutional duties to govern and to oppose. They cooperate to secure 
those ‘structures that are to house and refine our disputes and the processes that are to 
regulate the way we resolve them’.92 The whips will jointly agree the attendance of 
members in the chamber, the order and amount of speaking time, the need for and 
timing of divisions, the pairing of members who must be absent from divisions, and 
other facets of good House management. The complicated set of arrangements settled 
by the usual channels allows the public face of the Commons to proceed in 
disagreement and in an orderly way; indeed, so orderly is the management of business 
that the notoriety of disagreement between Prime Minister and Opposition Leader can 
shield from view the consensus upon which it rests. In this frame, Jennings 
reconstructs a telling, even if fictional account of the negotiations behind the 
Speaker’s chair: 
 
Chief Whip: Well, I’ll make you an offer. If you’ll close down the 
debate on the Shrimp Industry Reorganisation Bill at seven on 
Monday and let us have a couple of small Bills that same evening, 
we’ll let you move your vote of censure on Tuesday. 
 
Opposition Whip: Will that mean suspending the ten o’clock rule on 
Monday? 
 
Chief Whip: I’m afraid so, but I’ll try to stop our men from talking if 
you’ll do the same. 
 
Opposition Whip: Very well, thanks very much.93 
 
Come Monday, the Chief Whip moves to suspend the ten o’clock rule and, for 
‘form’s sake’ the Opposition objects, but the motion is carried without debate.94 Once 
debate on the reorganisation of the shrimp industry has carried past seven o’clock, the 
Chief Whip moves to close debate, which is again opposed, for form’s sake, but 
carried again without debate. The small bills are discussed, opposed, but not 
obstructed. On Tuesday, the House proceeds to consider whether the government 
ought to be censured. The opposition loses the vote as both government and 
Opposition expected it to.  
 
                                                 
91 The effect of a motion of no confidence has been qualified by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, 
s. 2. 
92 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 5 = Waldron ‘Political Political Theory’ (n 3) 8. 
93 Jennings, Parliament (n 70) 158. This same theme is carefully explored in Rose (n 53) c. 2 
(‘Adversary or Consensus Politics?’) and c. 5 (‘Adversary Parliament and Consensus Legislation’). 
94 ibid 158. 
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Be it through the exercise of mutual restraint or active cooperation in managing 
conflict in the House, the competition between government and Opposition trades on 
the understanding that the government, with its majority, will realise the greater part 
of its programme and that the Opposition, with its minority, will be empowered to 
make known its criticism. With the conventions that bind it in defeat between general 
elections, the Opposition will appeal to two tools of responsible opposition: time and 
argument. 
 
6.  Time and argument 
 
The cases for and against government proposals are communicated in the regular 
conflict between government and opposition. But for debate and questions put and 
answers demanded, government business would be carried far more quickly and far 
more business would be concluded. Parliamentary procedure delays what would 
otherwise be the unobstructed passage of the government’s programme.95 A telling 
illustration of the delay occasioned by parliamentary opposition is how between ‘1 
and 7 September 1939 Parliament passed enough legislation to occupy two or three 
sessions, because the Opposition agreed not to oppose’.96 Yet, the constitution, save 
in the most exceptional circumstances, is designed to facilitate the Opposition. In this 
light, it has been said that time spent debating government business ought to be 
considered Opposition time: ‘they are the participants that want the debate and spend 
time on it’.97 Given that the Opposition is entitled to its time to criticise the 
government and to examine and to comment on proposals brought before the House, 
the question arises: how is that criticism to be formulated and to what end is it to be 
pursued? 
 
The complexities of the public good suggest that the government will never have an 
unanswerable case in favour of its programme. As a result, it is sometimes suggested 
that the end sought by Opposition criticism is to oppose indiscriminately and 
excessively. The clever ‘oppositionist’ will always be in a position to locate some 
ground for censure. He will question the motivation for the measure, pairing any 
virtue with vice—courage with rashness, caution with timidity, firmness with 
obstinacy, confidence with arrogance—and so, ‘by a slight deflection of the ethical 
nomenclature’, will taint the minister responsible for the measure with ‘unfavourable 
associations’.98 He will question the timing of the measure, arguing that it is 
premature or that it is too late; he will maintain that it should first be studied by a 
committee of experts or, if it has been, that the government in so doing has delegated 
the responsibilities of office.99 The able critic will argue that even if the proposal is 
desirable in principle, in its design it is too timid or it is being carried too far.100 The 
                                                 
95 In ‘Playing by the Rules: The Constraining Hand of Parliamentary Procedure’ (2001) 7 Journal of 
Legislative Studies 13, Philip Norton (Lord Norton of Louth) reviews the staying power of procedure 
notwithstanding that a majority government ‘has the political resources to change procedure’: ibid 25. 
Among the reasons identified by Norton for the persistence of procedure are ‘consensus’ between 
government and Opposition and how ‘[e]ach accepts the legitimacy of the other in what it seeks to do’: 
ibid 28. 
96 Jennings, British Constitution (n 20) 88. 
97 Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (n 12) 13.  
98 Anonymous (n 43) 9. 
99 ibid 12. 
100 ibid 11. 
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indiscriminate opposition member will always be able to locate an argument against 
the government’s case.  
 
Indiscriminate and excessive criticism, however, is not the strategy of a good 
opposition. That is not to say that it is ineffective or unwarranted. An important 
opposition duty is to remind the governing majority of Cromwell’s injunction: ‘I 
beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you are mistaken’.101 
However, the Official Opposition’s critical responsibilities are not its only 
responsibilities and an appreciation of those other duties informs the end of its 
criticism: the Opposition seeks the office of government and that pursuit of office 
through persuasion (not revolution) channels its critical function, facilitating it in 
some respects, complicating it in others.  
 
An Official Opposition insufficiently attentive to its role as the government-in-
waiting will approximate Tierney’s thesis and the argumentative tactics of the 
indiscriminate critic. It will fall foul the excesses of critical opposition, seeking 
artificial disagreement and divisions, engaging in a ‘disguised civil war’,102 opposing 
what is good and defending the opposite because of the source rather than the merits 
of the measures. This complication does not afflict those minority opposition parties 
without expectation of office. But even here, caution in criticism is warranted. When 
parliamentary opposition is understood to be no more than ‘shame warfare’,103 to be 
no more than pursued in the interests of party, not country, the government may 
escape criticism by dismissing it as empty partisanship and the opposition will lose 
credibility in holding the government to account. In this way, the Opposition’s office-
seeking function and the other opposition parties’ desire to maintain popular support 
facilitate their critical roles: it encourages the opposition benches to relate public 
opinion outside to political criticism inside and, so, to seek to make a better claim to 
represent the electorate than the government. The opposition seeks to make itself ‘a 
focus for the discontent of the people’104 and to present itself not only as critical of the 
government of the day but also, in the case of the Official Opposition, as the 
alternative government of tomorrow.  
 
When the questions put to the government by the opposition are the questions asked 
by the everyman and everywoman, an able minister will know to answer not the 
member opposite but those who ask the same questions beyond the chamber. The 
minister will know that whilst the composition of the Commons is determined on 
election day, the public opinion that carried the government to office does not await 
the next general election before expressing itself again. In this way, the opposition, no 
matter the size of its minority, can augment its authority in the House by capturing 
public opinion better than the government. Through debate between government and 
opposition in the chamber, ‘the appeal to the people is not an occasional ceremony, 
but a process which goes on daily and hourly in the parliamentary session’.105 The 
opposition’s appeal to the better argument is not always voiced with the hope of 
defeating government policy (although the government’s majority does fracture and 
                                                 
101 As cited in Jennings, The British Constitution (n 20) 87. 
102 Punnett (n 51) 27, citing Disraeli. 
103 ibid 28. 
104 Jennings, Cabinet Government (n 46) 16. As illustration, consider how many opposition parties 
campaign on a promise of ‘change’. 
105 Jennings, The British Constitution (n 20) 88. 
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the opposition will aim to fracture it from time to time),106 but with the aims of 
defeating the government at the next election and weakening it until then.  
 
In channelling its criticism, the opposition must be selective in its strategy and, in the 
case of the Official Opposition, constructive in making a case for office. Here is an 
important way in which the pursuit of office complicates the Opposition’s critical 
function. The Tierney thesis that the Opposition is ‘to propose nothing’ cannot be 
carried too far, lest the electorate conclude that the rightful place of the party in 
Opposition is as a parliamentary check on government. It is true that the Opposition, 
with few exceptions, does not propose measures with the aim of seeing them adopted. 
But the Opposition will nonetheless be compelled, from time to time, to answer the 
Minister’s retort to criticism: ‘I welcome suggestions for improvement, if you have 
any.’ In pairing criticism of the government’s proposal with an alternative proposal, 
the Opposition faces the challenge of giving the appearance of being ready for office 
without determining its governing policy before encountering the realities of office. 
An able Opposition will set out an alternative proposal ‘without presenting too many 
clear targets for the government to ridicule as “dangerous Opposition star-gazing”’ 
and will condemn the government’s present action without pledging itself to reversing 
every government decision.107 If the Opposition misplays its hand, it will find itself 
defending its proposals from government criticism and so lose the advantage of 
keeping the government on the defensive. Even if it successfully deflects government 
criticism, the Opposition may nonetheless find itself, on coming to power, to be like 
‘a speculative merchant whose bills become due’.108 The question—‘What did the 
Prime Minister say when in Opposition?’—is a question that will be put by many in 
the chamber, including by many who welcomed the Opposition into office in the hope 
that it would undo what it had argued needed to be undone. It would be unreasonable 
for the Opposition to pledge itself to undo all that the government does. Some laws 
will be ‘well settled and ground good states of affairs’;109 more generally, the 
Opposition-turned-government takes office at the helm of a continuous enterprise 
adjusted to past acts, which a new government should not undo merely because it 
would have done different. 
 
The Opposition’s office-seeking function channels its critical function and can 
facilitate it, but, as just reviewed, it can complicate criticism of government as well. 
Wheare was right to warn that the expectation of office can make ‘an opposition too 
well behaved to make the government behave’.110 A popular government measure, 
even if misguided, will be difficult to challenge by an Opposition seeking that same 
popularity. In this respect, the Commons is well served by having parties in 
opposition with no hope of office. 
                                                 
106 Four recent examples: Thatcher’s government exceptionally lost the second reading vote on the 
Shops Bill 1986; Blair’s government lost the vote on the proposed 90-day detention in his Anti-
Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001; and Cameron’s government delayed a July 2015 vote on the 
Draft Hunting Act 2004 (Exempt Hunting) (Amendment) Order 2015 after concluding that it did not 
have the numbers to support it and, at the time of writing, is reported to have abandoned its proposal in 
the Enterprise Bill 2015-16 to extending Sunday shopping opening hours after losing a Commons vote.  
107 Punnett (n 51) 214. 
108 Bagehot (n 1) 126. 
109 Ekins (n 71) 140 (footnote omitted); more generally on ‘legislative integrity’, see 139-142. 
110 Wheare (n 56) 95. See further Bertrand de Jouvenel, ‘The Means of Contestation’ (1966) 1 
Government and Opposition 155, 161: ‘the essential value of the [Roman] Tribunate was that the 
people were defended by those who did not aspire to become masters.’ 
20 
 
 
The art of opposition is thus a selective art. It appeals to political judgment in 
knowing how to attend to the tension between criticism of the present government and 
aspiration to become the next government; between facilitating the management of 
government business in the House and opposing it by voice and vote; between 
opposing the government’s measures and being compelled to propose alternative 
measures; between promoting itself for office and not appearing to care only for 
office; and between securing quiet concessions on bills in the corridors outside the 
chamber and maintaining public and publicised criticism of the government’s 
proposals in the chamber. A successful opposition strategy cannot afford to care only 
for one half of the equations just outlined.  
 
7.  Responsible Opposition 
 
It is said to be an organising principle of the constitution that Her Majesty’s 
government must be carried on. That principle can be seen at work in the Official 
Opposition’s practice of criticising without obstructing the present government and in 
its readiness to form the next government. The Opposition is committed to facilitating 
government business by sharing in the management of the House and makes known 
its criticism on the understanding that, should it be successful in making a 
determinative case against the government in the Commons or at the next election, it 
is ready and willing to assume the fruits of that success. In fulfilling its duty to hold 
the government to account and to make real the conventions of responsible 
government, the Official Opposition sustains a convention that receives rather less 
attention than it warrants: responsible Opposition.111  
 
This responsibility is realised in fulfilling the many constitutional roles attributed to 
the Opposition, roles that do more than facilitate its passage from opposition to 
government: to criticise the government’s measures but, on the whole, not to seek to 
realise its own measures; to oppose but not to obstruct government business (unless 
government conduct releases it from the reciprocal duty of forbearance); to fulfil the 
greater part of the Commons’ constitutional responsibility to scrutinise the 
government’s legislative proposals and administration; to ask questions, to scrutinise, 
and to publicise government failures; to facilitate the management of the House with 
the government’s Chief Whip and to populate select and public bill committees; to 
accept the conventions that bind it in defeat and acknowledge that the government is 
entitled to see the greater part of its programme through; to collaborate with the 
government from time to time on aspects of constitutional and foreign policy where 
consensus is called for; to join the Prime Minister in representing the Commons at the 
State Opening of Parliament; to assume office following the next election victory and 
to measure its criticisms to that end; and, in time, to award to the outgoing 
government the respect and standing owed to a political opponent under the 
constitution. 
 
In fulfilling and coordinating these roles and responsibilities, the Opposition organises 
itself in a manner that tracks the conventions of responsible government. The practice 
of organising opposition members into a shadow cabinet began in the nineteenth 
                                                 
111 Rose (n 53) 22 suggests that the Opposition’s strategy is to navigate between being ‘irresponsible’ 
and ‘too responsible’. 
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century when the ex-cabinet continued to meet as a collegiate body in order to 
coordinate opposition strategy. It was, as it now continues to be, an ‘off-shoot from 
the institutions of government’,112 including the decision of shadow cabinets past and 
present to endorse the conventions of cabinet solidarity and confidentiality. The 
shadow cabinet helps present the Opposition as the government-in-waiting, a role 
now so central to the position of the Opposition that, in its absence, it was thought 
that there could be no Opposition. On the formation of Churchill’s wartime coalition 
cabinet in 1940, the Speaker was confronted with the question who should be 
recognised as the Opposition to the Conservative-Labour-Liberal ministry. The 
Speaker’s reply: no one. ‘It cannot be said’, he ruled, ‘that there is now an Opposition 
in Parliament in the hitherto accepted meaning of the words; namely, a party in 
Opposition to the Government from which an alternative Government could be 
formed’.113 The conventions of responsible Opposition informed the Speaker’s 
understanding of what could count as the Official Opposition.  
 
It was perhaps only a matter of time before the shadow cabinet, mandated to 
coordinate Opposition strategy, would evolve into a shadow government so as better 
to realise that strategy. It is to the Labour Party’s opposition in the long years of 
Conservative rule between 1951 and 1964 that is credited the standing practice of 
identifying Shadow Ministers to be opposition spokespersons on specific ministerial 
files.114 The decision to award to certain opposition members special responsibility on 
policy questions would result in a sharper distinction between the Opposition 
frontbench and backbenches, tracking the distinction between the government 
frontbench and backbenches. The Opposition spokesman ‘shadows’ her ministerial 
counterpart, developing expertise in the portfolio and criticising the minister for her 
policy decisions and indecision and the administration of her department. Through the 
exercise of her critical function, the shadow minister develops an understanding of the 
portfolio and readies herself for office. Indeed, so prominent is the role of the 
Opposition frontbench that it can be said that the responsibility to hold the 
government to account has passed, over time, from Parliament as a whole to the 
opposition specifically and, since the mid-twentieth century, from the opposition as a 
whole to the shadow government especially.  
 
That specialisation and the corresponding burden on a shadow minister to challenge 
her opposite number necessitated the assistance of others. The financial support 
awarded to the Opposition by House resolutions is in part devoted to sustaining what 
might be termed a shadow administration.115 That administration does not mirror the 
government’s civil service in every respect: it is neither permanent nor impartial. It is 
wholly within the control of the party and its aims are primarily critical. But it 
supports the shadow minister as a department supports the minister on the 
understanding that responsible Opposition, like responsible government, necessitates 
more time and skill than can be found on the frontbenches. In organising itself as a 
                                                 
112 Punnett (n 51) 8. That off-shoot is less direct in the case of the Labour shadow cabinet, which 
emerged not from the loss of office, but from years in opposition.  
113 HC Deb. vol. 361 col. 27 (21 May 1940). For certain business purposes, a Labour MP – a supporter 
of the Government – was appointed Leader of the Opposition. (I thank an anonymous referee for this 
point.) 
114 Punnett (n 51) 36. In other countries, the title awarded to an opposition spokesperson is ‘critic’. 
Taken together, ‘Opposition critic’ and ‘Shadow Minister’ capture the Opposition’s two important 
functions: to criticise the government of the day and to prepare itself for office. 
115 The term ‘shadow administration’ is owed to Brazier, Constitutional Practice (n 12) 174. 
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cabinet, government, and administration, the Opposition can be said to adhere to the 
conventions of responsible government.  
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
Political public law and political constitutional theory invite a re-questioning of some 
commonplace understandings of the constitution. A study of the opposition within 
political institutions, structures, and processes complicates accounts of Parliament—
and the Commons especially—by inviting reflection on how the institution is not 
singular in its claims or composition, but rather the site of confrontation between Her 
Majesty’s Government and Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition. It allows for the 
reformulation of the primary actors engaged in action and reaction: in the place of 
government and Parliament or Cabinet and Commons, political life may be said to 
revolve around the action and reaction of government and opposition. In turn, it 
allows one to dissolve the ‘obvious paradox’ of the Commons’ constitutional 
responsibilities by assigning to the government’s backbenchers the primary 
responsibility to maintain the government in office and to the opposition the primary 
responsibility to hold the government to account. By highlighting how the Commons 
is managed jointly by government and opposition, it resists the idea that the Cabinet 
dominates the Commons by constitutional definition. 
 
I conclude with thoughts on the consequences for the idea of the Official Opposition 
as a government-in-waiting should the proliferation of parties, aided or not by 
electoral reform, challenge the assumption of majority governments. The possibility 
that the Commons will evolve such that no one party in opposition will stand out as 
the likely successor to those now in office may weaken the ability of the opposition to 
hold the government to account. Absent the threat to replace the government, the idea 
of an Official Opposition may lose its significance, as it did during Churchill’s 
wartime coalition government. The shift in the balance of the constitution from the 
three estates of the realm to the swing of the pendulum between HM Government and 
HM Loyal Opposition would be lost and perhaps be relocated within the dynamics of 
a new normal of coalition governments, with a balance internal to a government 
coalition.116 Some will see merit in that possibility, but its merits do not include an 
open and transparent confrontation of ideas, given the likelihood that coalition 
partners would resolve their differences elsewhere than on the floor of the House. Nor 
do the merits include the ability to provide the electorate with an unambiguous ability 
to ‘throw the rascals out’. Whatever the failings of the constitution’s continuing 
privileging of a single party in opposition as the Official Opposition, one of its great 
merits is ‘to structure an institutional environment to house and accommodate the 
rival views’,117 all the while maintaining an important, but less privileged place to the 
other opposition parties. Being Leader of the Opposition is often said to be ‘the worst 
job in British politics’, but in playing a primary role in holding the government to 
account, in managing the business of the House, and in seeking office as the next 
Prime Minister, it is a job that has well served the constitution and our understanding 
of the principle of loyal opposition within it. 
                                                 
116 Commenting on the West German example of ‘coalition government in a Westminster system’, 
King (n 11) 29 would that the inter-party mode—rather than the government and opposition mode or 
the government frontbench and backbench mode—‘is undoubtedly the most important … in general 
political terms’. 
117 Waldron, Political Political Theory (n 3) 7 = Waldron, ‘Political Political Theory’ (n 3) 9. 
